

Jury Inquiry Urged on Chile Data

Panel Gets Report

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

A Senate staff report recommends that a perjury investigation be initiated against former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms and accuses Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger of having "deceived" the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in sworn testimony.

The report, which centers on testimony given by high-ranking officials on U.S. covert intervention in Chile's internal political affairs, also recommends perjury and contempt investigations of three other government witnesses in the Chile inquiry.

Prepared by Jerome Levinson, chief counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, the confidential report will be taken up for possible action today at an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The committee has the option of endorsing or rejecting the report in whole or in part.

The targets of the proposed investigations are former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles E. Meyer, former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry, and William Broe, former chief of the CIA's Latin American Division.

The report, submitted to subcommittee chairman Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), also asks that the record of Kissinger's confirmation hearing be reopened in public session to question the secretary on the "rationale" for U.S. covert political actions in Chile after 1969.

It further recommended that Kissinger be asked to testify generally on U.S. policy toward "duly elected governments" which may be anticipated not to follow policies to the liking of the United States."

The staff recommendations reflected rising concern in Congress over major discrepancies in the sworn testimony of high State Department witnesses and the disclosure of secret testimony last April 22 by CIA Director William E. Colby that the agency spent \$3 million in Chile to foil the late Salvador Allende's candidacy in 1964 and \$8 million attempting to block his election and undermine his government after 1969.

The report cites previously secret testimony by Kissinger, delivered at an executive session of his confirmation hearing on Sept. 17, 1973, minimizing the role of the CIA in the 1970 Allende election.

It quotes Kissinger as saying:

"The CIA was heavily involved in 1964 in the election, was in a very minor way involved in the 1970 election and since then we have absolutely stayed away from any coups. Our efforts in Chile were to strengthen the democratic political parties and give them a basis for winning the election in 1976, which we expressed our hope was that Allende could be defeated in a free democratic election."

At the time Kissinger gave his testimony, the report noted, "the Forty Committee [the National Security Council's senior covert action panel] had already authorized the expenditure of . . . \$8 million for the purpose of destabilizing the Allende government so as to precipitate its downfall."

Only a month before Kissinger testified, the report further noted, the Forty Committee—which he chaired—authorized the expenditure of \$1 million of this amount for "further political destabilization."

The basis for these assertions was the Colby testimony as recounted by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The CIA's only comment on the Harrington disclosure was to question whether Colby has used the word "destabilization" in his April 22 testimony to a House CIA oversight committee chaired by Rep. Lucien Nodzi (D Mich.).

Colby's only personal comment on the Harrington report was that he would neither confirm nor deny its authenticity since it was given in executive session. Last Friday Colby commented that the disclosure of his testimony through a confidential letter by Harrington to his chairman, Rep. Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) raised questions about the ability of government witnesses to testify on "delicate" matters.

The report described as "disingenuous" Kissinger's testimony that since 1970 "we have absolutely stayed away from any coups" in Chile. Kissinger, wrote Levinson, "must have known that expending funds for the express purpose of creating political destabilization had to enhance the possibility, indeed the probability, of the coup which, in fact, took place."

In the case of Helms, the report cited an exchange between the former CIA director and one of his leading senatorial defenders, Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), during an executive hearing on the Helms nomination as ambassador to Iran on Feb. 7, 1973.

Symington: Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?

Helms: No, sir.

Symington: So that the stories that you were involved in that are wrong entirely?"

Helms: Yes sir . . .

But Colby's testimony, as reported in the Harrington letter, was that the CIA expended \$500,000 in 1969 to fund anti-Allende forces and during the 1970 election \$500,000 was given to opposition party personnel. After the Sept. 4 popular election in which Allende won a plurality, the account continued, \$350,000 was authorized "to bribe the Chilean Congress" in an effort to "overturn" the results of the popular election in an ensuing congressional runoff.

The staff report alluded, for the first time, to the existence of a National Security Council Decision Memorandum prior to Allende's election which served as the "umbrella" under which the Forty Committee authorized clandestine activities designed to destabilize the Allende government.

Such a policy document would have been drafted under the direction of Kissinger who also chaired the Forty Committee meetings at which the anti-Allende action programs were authorized.

The report was also critical of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs John M. Hennessy, who assisted in coordinating U.S. economic policy toward the Allende government—that leaned heavily toward withdrawal of lines of credit by such international lending bodies as the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and Export-Import Bank.

Hennessy, said the Levinson report, "either perjured himself or seriously misled the subcommittee in stating that the primary consideration in U.S. economic policy toward the Allende government was Chile's credit-worthiness."

Broe, the CIA's highest-ranking operative for Latin

America, was quoted in the report as having testified that there was no U.S. policy to intervene in the 1970 Chilean election. Broe's answers, however, are "technically, shy, of perjury," the report concluded, though they were "intended to convey the impression of a policy of non-intervention."

The testimony of Nathaniel Davis, U.S. ambassador to Chile during last year's anti-Allende coup, conformed to the "overall pattern of State Department witnesses disseminating and deceiving the committee and subcommittee with respect to the true scope of U.S. government activities designed to undermine the Allende regime," the Levinson report added. No action, however, was recommended against Davis.

Kissinger and Meyer were not available for comment. Korry, reached in New York, said he was "gratified that Mr. Levinson, after deliberately spreading the word that I have committed perjury, now reached the conclusion that I have not."

00752